A Human Rights Exception to Sovereign Immunity: Some Thoughts on \u3cem\u3ePrincz v. Federal Republic of Germany\u3c/em\u3e by Reimann, Mathias
Michigan Journal of International Law 
Volume 16 Issue 2 
1995 
A Human Rights Exception to Sovereign Immunity: Some 
Thoughts on Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany 
Mathias Reimann 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil 
 Part of the Courts Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, and the Legal Remedies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mathias Reimann, A Human Rights Exception to Sovereign Immunity: Some Thoughts on Princz v. Federal 
Republic of Germany, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 403 (1995). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol16/iss2/3 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of 
International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
A HUMAN RIGHTS EXCEPTION TO
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: SOME




In a recent decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit granted sovereign immunity to the Federal
Republic of Germany with regard to acts committed by the Nazi
regime.' It thus dismissed the suit of a Jewish-American Holocaust
survivor without considering the merits. The U.S. Supreme Court has
denied certiorari. Since the defendant has persistently refused to pay
more than token compensation and since all diplomatic efforts on behalf
of the claimant have failed, the plaintiff is left without any legal remedy
against Germany.
I should make it clear at the outset that I am not concerned here
with the substantive merits of the plaintiff's claim. Whether he should
actually receive the multimillion compensation sought, or whether he
should be entitled to no more than the few thousand dollars offered by
the defendant is an issue about which reasonable people can differ.4 Nor
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Dr. jur., University of Freiburg,
Germany (1982); LL.M., University of Michigan (1983). I thank Jose Alvarez, Jochen
Frowein, John Jackson, Eric Stein, and Andreas Zimmermann for helpful comments on earlier
drafts. I should point out that their willingness to help and comment does not mean they share
the views presented here.
1. Princz v. F. R. G., 26 F3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 923 (1995).
The responsibility of the Federal Republic of Germany for acts committed by the Third Reich
is not disputed since the Federal Republic considers itself legally identical with the German
Reich. See 36 BVerfGE 1, 16 (1973).
2. 115 S. Ct. 923 (1995).
3. He is currently suing the successors of the companies for which he was forced to
perform slave labor. See infra note 45 and accompanying text. These companies do not enjoy
sovereign immunity, though they may have a variety of other defenses, such as statutes of
limitations.
4. On the one hand, the amount offered by the German government is extremely small in
comparison not only to the plaintiff's claim but also to the harm suffered. See infra note 39
and accompanying text. On the other hand, the offer allegedly amounts to what similarly
situated claimants received under the overall compensation scheme worked out between the
German government and the organizations representing the holocaust survivors; for a detailed
description of these compensation plans, see BERICHT DER BUNDESREGIERUNG OBER
WIEDERGUTMACHUNG UND ENTSCHADIGUNG FOR NAZIONALSOZIALISTISCHES UNRECHT SOWIE
OBER DIE LAGE DER SINTI, ROMA UND VERWANDTER GRUPPEN, Deutscher Bundestag, 10
Wahlperiode, Drucksache 10/6287 of Oct. 31, 1986; for a brief summary, see Note Verbale of
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must one overlook the fact that Germany has already spent and con-
tinues to disburse billions of dollars to compensate millions of holocaust
victims.5
Instead, I am concerned with the fact that this victim of egregious
human rights violations was denied even the opportunity to argue his
case on the merits. It is in denying the plaintiff his day in court that
Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany attests to a more general and
disconcerting phenomenon. It vividly demonstrates that a victim of
human rights abuses cannot sue the foreign sovereign who committed
them in an American court.6 This is true even if the violations are
undisputed, even if they are universally recognized as illegal as are
torture or genocide, and even if the victim is an American citizen.
In an age of international recognition of human rights,7 and especial-
ly in a country priding itself on their promotion, such a situation is
troublesome. It is true that victims of human rights violations can sue
the (foreign) individuals who committed them in American courts'
the Embassy of the German Federal Republic No. 42/93 to the State Department (dated July
1993), reprinted in the appendix to the Brief for the Respondent in Opposition to the Petition
for Certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States at la-6a, Princz v. F. R. G., cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 923 (1995) (No. 94-909) [hereinafter Brief]. Also, the plaintiff apparently
failed to apply for compensation when he was eligible under the compensations schemes set
up and financed by the German government. Brief at 5. According to the defendant's counsel,
even now the plaintiff is eligible under a compensation scheme implemented by the German
government in 1992 for a lump sum of approximately $3,400 and a monthly pension of $340
(beginning August 1995) but refuses to apply. Id. at 5-6.
5. See BERICHT, supra note 4; according the defendant's counsel, Germany had paid
approximately $75 billion to some two million claimants as of 1994. Brief, supra note 4, at 5.
For further details, see Zimmerman, Sovereign Immunity and Violations of International Jus
Cogens - Some Critical Remarks (in this issue).
6. Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11
(1976), there are several exceptions to this rule, but they rarely apply in human rights cases.
See infra notes 26-38 and accompanying text.
7. On the most recent developments, see Louis Henkin, Preface to HUMAN RIGHTS: AN
AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY vii-xx (Louis Henkin & John Lawrence Hargrove eds.,
1994) [hereinafter HENKIN & HARGROVE].
8. Suits can be brought either under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1789),
which allows actions by aliens only, and under the more recent Torture Victim Protection Act
of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (Supp. IV 1992), which gives a cause of action to American
citizens as well. These statutes are of little help in suits against foreign states, however. The
Torture Victim Protection Act clearly applies only to individuals, not to states. See S. REP. No.
249, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1991). Whether the Alien Tort Claims Act can be invoked against
foreign states is not entirely clear. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,
488 U.S. 428, 436-37 (1988) (leaving the question open). The statutory language is not limited
to individual defendants, and at least one court has applied the act against a state. Von Dardel
v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985) (alternative holding).
Yet, even if the act does apply against states, foreign sovereigns sued under it can still invoke
immunity under the FSIA. See Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 433-36. For an overview of current
avenues of civil redress, see Diane F. Orentlicher, Addressing Gross Human Rights Abuses:
Punishment and Victim Compensation, in HENKIN & HARGROVE, supra note 7, 425, at 448-59.
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because such individuals normally are not entitled to sovereign im-
munity.9 While plaintiffs have occasionally been successful in such
suits,' o in most cases actions against individuals will not help the vic-
tims. The individual torturer will often be personally unidentifiable,
beyond the personal jurisdiction of American courts," judgment proof,
or, as is likely in the Princz case, dead. Thus in most cases, the victim's
only hope for redress will be to sue the foreign state itself. The state,
however, normally escapes liability by invoking sovereign immunity.'
2
In the last few years, there have been several suggestions and at-
tempts to close off this escape route.' 3 Yet so far the efforts to exclude
at least massive human rights violations from sovereign immunity
protection have not borne fruit. This may change. Last term, a bill
providing for such an exclusion was introduced into Congress and
passed in the House of Representatives, 4 but died before the term
ended. There are plans, however, to reintroduce the bill.' Princz and
this pending legislation make it timely to bring the issue to the attention
of the legal community again.
The scope of this brief comment is narrow. It is neither a full-
fledged survey of all legal and political aspects of the problem, nor does
it reiterate or take issue with existing case law and scholarship. It mere-
ly analyzes the Princz case and the Congressional bill in the context of
9. The FSIA applies only to states and their agencies and instrumentalities, but not to
individuals. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a-b). But cf Trajano v. Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos
Litigation), 978 F.2d 493, 497 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Marcos-Manotoc v.
Trajano, 113 S. Ct. 2960 (1993) (FSIA trumps Alien Torts Claims Act when an individual is
sued in his or her capacity as a state official). Individuals may, however, be protected by
immunity because they are a (current) head of state, Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128
(E.D.N.Y. 1994), or because of their diplomatic or consular status, see Tom Lininger,
Overcoming Immunity Defenses to Human Rights Suits in U.S. Courts, 7 HARV. HUM. RTs. J.
177, 190-91 (1994).
10. The best known example is Filartiga v. Pena Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). See
generally Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge
of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461, 462 (1989).
11. In personam jurisdiction is clearly required. See S. REP. No. 249, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. 7 (1991). Individual defendants therefore cannot be haled into American courts if they
neither come to and are served with process in, nor have at least minimum contacts with, the
United States.
12. The Supreme Court's latest decision in the area of sovereign immunity provides
another example. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993) (involving alleged ground-
less and inhuman imprisonment and beatings).
13. See infra notes 27-38 and accompanying text. See also Jordan J. Paust, Draft Brief
Concerning Claims to Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Human Rights, 8 Hous. J. INT'L L.
49 (1985).
14. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
15. See Holocaust Victim Loses Court Fight Against Germany, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 23,
1995, at 19.
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the debate about human rights and sovereign immunity. Part I outlines
the legal developments preceding the case. Part II presents the courts'
decisions, explaining why after Princz any initiative rests in the hands of
Congress. Part III briefly summarizes the arguments in favor of denying
sovereign immunity for massive human rights violations. Finally, Part
IV considers the impact of the act of state doctrine on human rights
cases. Some of the thoughts presented here have been explored in
greater depth by others, and some will need to be fleshed out in greater
detail.
16
Though narrow in scope, this article is emphatic in its message. It is
time to deny immunity to foreign sovereigns for torture, genocide, or
enslavement, at least when they are sued by Americans in American
courts.' 7 Such a denial would be consonant with two developments that
have marked international law since World War II: the restriction of
sovereign immunity and the expansion of human rights protection.
I. BACKGROUND: IMMUNITY DESPITE VIOLATION OF JUS COGENS
A. Human Rights Law and Foreign Sovereign Immunity Law
It is important to recognize at the outset that the plaintiffs dilemma
in cases like Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany is the result of a
clash between two sets of rules - and of a particular way to resolve it.
On the one hand, fundamental human rights are part of international
law, as a plethora of conventions illustrates. 18 More importantly, a small
core of such rights is now widely accepted as jus cogens, i.e., as that
part of international law which is not only binding on all states regard-
less of their consent, but which also permits no derogation. 19 Whatever
other human rights may fall into this category, it is established that
among them are protections against genocide, enslavement, murder, and
16. See also Paul L. Hoffman & Nadine Strossen, Enforcing International Human Rights
Law in the United States, in HENKIN & HARGROVE, supra note 7, at 477, 493-502 (making
various suggestions how the Clinton administration should strengthen the protection of human
rights).
17. For the reasons for this limitation, see the discussion in Part III.
18. The most important conventions are reprinted in BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R.
TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED DOCUMENTS AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS 339-475
(1994); for overviews, see 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW
983-1030 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992); IAN BROWNLIE, PRIN-
CIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 553-602 (4th ed. 1990).
19. On the concept of jus cogens, see Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969);
BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 512-15.
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torture.2° A state that commits or permits such acts indisputably violates
international law, irrespective of membership in a human rights conven-
tion. Since customary international law, including jus cogens, is part of
the municipal law of the United States,2' such a state violates U.S. law
as well.22
On the other hand, foreign states are, as a general rule, immune
from suit in the courts of another sovereign. This general rule is not
only part of customary international law,23 but a part of municipal law
as well. In the United States, it was statutorily enacted by Congress in
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA).24
These rules come into conflict when a plaintiff sues for a massive
human rights violation in an American court because the first rule
establishes the wrongfulness of the act while the second prevents Ameri-
can courts from hearing complaints about it. At this point one needs to
decide which set of rules trumps. On the international level, the core
provisions of human rights law are arguably superior to sovereign
immunity law, because the former is jus cogens while the latter is only
a non-peremptory rule. On the domestic level, both have equal rank as
federal law. Nonetheless, it is generally accepted that the FSIA takes
precedence as far as it applies. This acceptance rests on two important
premises: that international law imposes no obligation to provide access
to domestic courts for claims that its norms have been violated, and that
Congress therefore has the power to limit the jurisdiction of both federal
20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)], § 702 note 11; Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in
Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 940-42 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (prohibition of slavery and
murder); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir. 1992)
(torture); Princz v. F. R. G., 26 F.3d 1166, 1174, 1179-81 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Jeffrey M. Blum
& Ralph G. Steinhard, Federal Jurisdiction over International Human Rights Claims: The
Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53 (1981);
BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 153 (for genocide, enslavement, and crimes against humanity);
MENNO T. KAMMINGA, INTER-STATE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
158 (1992) (torture, slavery, and right to life). Particularly genocide and torture are outlawed
by international conventions. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (ratified by the U.S. on Nov. 4, 1988, and
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1091); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), modified by 24
I.L.M. 535 (1985) (ratified by the U.S. on Apr. 30, 1994, and codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2340).
21. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); Rest. 3d § 111 (1).
22. This does not necessarily mean that a plaintiff has a cause of action or an actual
remedy for such a human rights violation, only that international and thus domestic American
law establish the wrongfulness of the act. In fact, international law normally does not estab-
lish a cause of action, but (foreign or domestic) municipal law often will, e.g. in the law of
torts.
23. See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
24. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1988).
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and state courts in cases against foreign sovereigns." In short, suits
against foreign states - even for violations of international law - are
allowed only to the extent permitted by domestic law, i.e. by the FSIA.
B. Human Rights Claims under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
The crucial question therefore is whether the FSIA allows suits
against foreign sovereigns in cases of massive human rights violations
committed in a foreign country. A plain reading of the act suggests that
it does not. The FSIA lists several explicit exceptions to the general rule
of immunity, most importantly for commercial activities, but it contains
no such exception for infractions of human rights.26 Yet, far from set-
tling the issue, this is only the beginning of the debate about the
relationship between sovereign immunity and violations- of international
law. Plaintiffs and scholars have contended that notwithstanding the lack
of an explicit exception in the FSIA, immunity should not be granted
where the foreign sovereign has violated international law. This argu-
ment proceeds, on two levels.
On the first level, the argument is that violations of international law
are not governed by the FSIA at all'because Congress did not intend to
affect remedies for such violations.27 This proposition. was rejected in
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.28 The plaintiff
sought compensation under. the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) for-the loss of
a ship which the Argentine Air Force allegedly had damaged in viola-
tion of international law during the Falklands war. A unanimous
Supreme Court, pushing aside 'the ATS, first decided that the FSIA is
"the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in our
courts." 29 It then held that-Congress did not intend to exclude violations
of international law from the immunity rule under the FSIA. The
Court's interpretation of the act is plausible. The FSIA in fact contains
one explicit, though very limited, exception for violations of internation-
25. This authority is part of the foreign affairs powers granted to Congress under Article
I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution; with regard specifically to the federal courts, it
can also be justified under Article III, Section 1.
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1988).
27. See Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246, 253-54
(D.D.C. 1985) (FSIA does not apply to acts in clear violation of international law); but cf.
notes 48-50 and accompanying text infra.
28. 488 U.S. 428 (1988).
29. Id. at 434. Justices Blackmun and Marshall concurred in part because they did not
agree with the majority's decision regarding the various exceptions to immunity under the
FSIA; unlike the majority, they did not consider them to be properly before the Court. Id. at
443-44.
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al law3° which in turn suggests that the immunity rule applies in all
other situations. In sum, "immunity is granted in those cases involving
alleged violations of international law that do not come within one of
the FSIA's exceptions. 3 1
This leaves only arguments on the second level, namely that one or
more of the FSIA's exceptions indeed apply. In Amerada Hess, the
Supreme. Court gave those invoked by the plaintiff short shrift. The
exception for torts occurring within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States was quickly rejected since the attack on the ship had taken
place in the South Atlantic. The court also found the act's treaty and
waiver exceptions inapplicable for reasons that are best considered in the
context of the Princz decision, discussed below.32
*A student comment responded to Amerada Hess and pointed out that
there remained a way to allow suits for massive human rights violations
in spite of the Supreme Court's holdings.33 The decision left open the
option to consider a violation of international jus cogens as an implicit
waiver of immunity under the FSIA. The authors suggested that in cases
of massive human rights violations, immunity be denied on this
ground.34 This approach fits traditional conceptions of waiver poorly
since it construes waiver where there is no indication of any actual will
to forego protection.
3 5
This waiver rationale was recently rejected, albeit with obvious
regret, in Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina.36 The plaintiffs
sued, among other things, for injuries suffered from unlawful detention
and torture. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized especially
torture as a clear violation of international jus cogens.37 It also endorsed
the student comment's argument for denying immunity, but only as
matter of international law. Nonetheless, the court 'felt, the Supreme
Court's unequivocal message in Amerada Hess demanded strict
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1988) provides an exception from immunity in certain cases
"in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue."
31. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 436 (1988).
32. Infra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
33. Adam C. Belsky et al., Comment, Implied Waiver Under the FSIA: A Proposed
Exception to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms of International Law, 77 CAL. L.
REV. 365 (1989) [hereinafter Implied Waiver]:
34. Id.
35. Even aside from waiver, the comment presented an interesting argument in favor of
denying immunity for jus cogens violations, relying on the nature and function of jus cogens
particularly in the area of human rights. We will turn to the substance of this argument when
we consider the desirability of legislative' changes, in Part III, infra.
36. 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992).
37. Id. at 716-17.
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adherence to domestic law, i.e. to the limits set by the FSIA. Since the
violation of jus cogens on foreign soil did not fall under any of the act's
exceptions, immunity could not be denied on this ground.3"
Amerada Hess and Siderman made clear that every plaintiff suing a
foreign sovereign for human rights violations in an American court was
fighting a very difficult uphill battle. When Siderman was decided,
however, Hugo Princz's case against the Federal Republic of Germany
was already pending in the Federal District Court for the District of
Columbia.
II. THE PRINCZ CASE: AFFIRMATION AND EXTENSION
A. A Holocaust Survivor's Tale39
When World War II broke out in 1939, seventeen-year old Hugo
Princz and his family were American citizens living in Czechoslovakia,
a German-occupied protectorate of the Third Reich. In 1942, shortly
after Germany's declaration of war on the United States, they were
arrested as enemy aliens, as was the internationally recognized routine in
such cases. Normally, foreign nationals were then exchanged to their
home country. Since the Princz family was Jewish, however, the Ger-
man authorities disregarded their American citizenship and sent them to
a concentration camp.
Hugo Princz's fate between 1942 and 1945 is a tale of horror. He
was separated from his parents and his sister, who died probably in the
Treblinka concentration camp. Hugo and his brothers were interned at
Auschwitz and then leased as slave laborers to German industrial con-
cerns supporting the war effort. When his brothers suffered work in-
juries, they were starved to death virtually before the plaintiff's eyes in
the Birkenau "hospital." After a few months in the Warsaw ghetto,
Hugo Princz was again forced to perform slave labor under inhuman
conditions, this time in an underground facility of the Messerschmidt
aircraft factory. Towards the end of the war, he and his fellow prisoners
were herded into cattle cars and were en route to execution when Amer-
ican soldiers finally liberated him.
Since the Nazis had stenciled "USA" on Princz's clothing, American
38. Id. at 718-19. The court found, however, that Argentina had waived its immunity by
using the assistance of American courts in the persecution of the victims, id. at 720-22.
39. The following fact summary is based on the two decisions rendered in the case, Princz
v. F. R. G., 813 F. Supp. 22, 23-25, 28 (D.D.C. 1992) and Princz v. F. R. G., 26 F.3d 1166,
1168-69, 1176-78 (D.C. Cir. 1994), as well as the original complaint, Princz v. F. R. G.,
(D.D.C. 1992) (No. 92-0644) (on file with the author). The facts are essentially undisputed.
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army personnel recognized him as a fellow citizen. Therefore he was not
brought to a Center for Displaced Persons like other prisoners, but was
checked into an American army hospital. He later returned to the United
States and now lives in New Jersey.
Princz's many efforts to get compensation for his suffering ultimate-
ly failed. He found himself disqualified from all compensation funds for
varying reasons - because at the time of his enslavement he was an
American citizen, because he had not been processed through a Center
for Displaced Persons, because he failed to apply before an extended
deadline of which he was not aware, etc.4° In 1986, Mr. Princz began to
seek an ex gratia payment from the German government. Despite the
support of Senator Bradley, the State Department, both Houses of Con-
gress,4' and ultimately President Clinton himself,42 the German govern-
ment adamantly refused to make such a payment, fearing an avalanche
of claims.43 Instead, the defendant referred the plaintiff to the awards
available under the general compensation schemes. The plaintiff and his
lawyers, however, refused such small sums as an offense to Mr. Princz's
dignity." In March of 1992, Princz filed suit.
45
B. The Case in the District Court
It seemed that after Amerada Hess and Siderman, the Federal Re-
public of Germany was entitled to sovereign immunity as a matter of
course. But after an "explosive hearing," 46 Judge Stanley Sporkin denied
40. In a letter to the New York imes, the defendant's counsel alleged that the plaintiff
did not file a claim with the Jewish Claims Commission in New York which distributed funds
to Nazi victims. See Germany Offers Fair Holocaust Reparations, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 10, 1994,
at A10. Allegedly, the plaintiff also refused to apply for a lump sum payment and a monthly
pension under a scheme implemented by the German government and the Claims Conference
in 1992. See supra note 4.
41. See S. Res. 162, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H. R. Res. 323, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1994).
42. President Clinton raised the matter personally with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl
at a meeting on Jan. 31, 1994. Princz v. F. R. G., 23 F.3d 1166, 1177 (1994) (Wald, J.,
dissenting).
43. See Eva M. Rodriguez, Survivor Can't Sue Germany, LEGAL TIMES, July 11, 1994, at
6. Compensation for slave labor performed during World War II is currently much debated
and actually litigated in Germany, particularly with regard to Eastern European victims; see
ALBRECHT RANDELZHOFER & OLIVER DORR, ENTSCHADIGUNG FOR ZWANGSARBEIT (1994).
44. See Rodriguez, Survivor Can't Sue Germany, supra note 43, at 6.
45. Plaintiff demanded $17,000,000 as compensation for the slave labor he was forced to
perform, but listed as causes action false imprisonment, assault and battery, infliction of
emotional distress, and quantum meruit. Complaint at 12-17, Princz v. F. R. G., 813 F. Supp.
22 (D.D.C. 1992) (No. 92-0644).
46. See Eva M. Rodriguez, Germans Still Cool to Princz's Claim, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 14,
1994, at 16. The article does not specify what exactly transpired at the hearing. The tran-
scripts of the hearings on Dec. 11, 1992 and on Apr. 4, 1993 show that Judge Sporkin was
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the defendant's motion to dismiss and found that the court had jurisdic-
tion.47 In his indignant opinion one can identify three reasons for this
surprising result.
First, the court found the FSIA inapplicable. It recognized that
according to Amerada Hess, the act was the sole basis for jurisdiction,
but Judge Sporkin insisted that "the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
has no role to play where the claims alleged involve undisputed acts of
barbarism committed by a one-time outlaw nation. 48 Judge Sporkin
tried to distinguish Amerada Hess by writing that "the Supreme Court
did not have such extraordinary facts as those presently before this
Court in rendering its decision., 49 He also refused to believe "that, in
enacting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Congress contemplated
a factual scenario akin to that at bar., 50 In short, he held that not-
withstanding the FSIA and the Supreme Court's insistence that the act
permitted no unwritten exception, there was no immunity for human
rights violations of such magnitude.
Second, the court denied the defendant the right to invoke the FSIA
because a "government which stands in the shoes of a rogue nation the
likes of Nazi Germany is estopped from asserting U.S. law in this
fashion."' The justification for this unusual argument was that "to allow
otherwise would create a severe imbalance in the reciprocity and mutual
respect which must exist between nations, and would work intolerable
injustice against the plaintiff and the principles for which this country
stands. 52
Finally, Judge Sporkin found that the plaintiff had a right of access
to the courts because of his American citizenship. "If Mr. Princz's
citizenship means anything, it must mean that he can seek vindication of
unwilling to listen to defense counsels' legal arguments; the respective excerpts from the
transcripts are reprinted in the appendix to the Brief, supra note 4, at 5§a-63.
47. Princz v. F R. G., 813 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1992).
48. Id. at 26. Judge Sporkin's refusal to apply the FSIA created a problem of its own. If
the FSIA is the only basis for jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign (as Amerada Hess
indicates), finding the FSIA inapplicable left not only the German government without
immunity, but the court without jurisdiction, and thus it could not possibly help the plaintiff.
Judge Sporkin did not address, and perhaps overlooked, this problem, but it played a major
role in the decision on appeal. The Court of Appeals found that even if the FSIA was
inapplicable to events occurring over thirty years before its enactment, the action still had to
be dismissed, because the federal courts lacked a jurisdictional basis. Princz v. F. R. G., 26
F.3d 1166, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1994). At least theoretically, however, this left open the pos-
sibility of refiling the case in state court.
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his rights in the courts of this nation .... An American court must be
available to the plaintiff, particularly since every other avenue of redress
has been foreclosed to him."53 Closing the court doors would mean to
inflict "another horrendous indignity" upon the plaintiff who had already
suffered enough.54
To criticize these arguments as untenable under the FSIA and ac-
cording to conventional legal reasoning is easy but would miss the
point. Judge Sporkin did not endeavor to write a conventional opinion.
Instead, his very point was to deny immunity despite all authority to the
contrary because he strongly felt that justice forbade closing the court's
doors to the plaintiff. As a matter of such higher justice, his reasoning is
neither absurd nor unappealing. The problem is only that, as the Court
of Appeals put it, "such is not the law.
55
C. The Case in the Court of Appeals
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed. It granted the
defendant immunity, consequently found that the court lacked jurisdic-
tion, and dismissed the case.56
Much of the long and complex opinion dealt with the* question
whether the FSIA applied retroactively to events that occurred more
than thirty years before its enactment. This aspect is of little interest
here, and the majority left the retroactivity. question open. We will focus
on the part of the opinion that proceeded on the assumption that the
FSIA applied.
In contrast to Judge Sporkin below, the Court of Appeals took a
conventional approach. Both the majority and the dissent cited Amerada
Hess at the outset57 and never doubted that human rights violations by a
foreign sovereign are actionable in American courts only to the extent
permitted by the FSIA (assuming its retroactive effect). This narrowed
the inquiry dramatically because at this point the only remaining ques-
tion was whether any of the FSIA's exceptions from the rule of im-
munity applied. It is here that the majority and the dissent parted ways.
Judge Ginsburg, writing for the majority, considered and rejected
three possibilities. He began with, the commercial acts exception and
discussed whether the defendant's leasing of the plaintiff as a slave
laborer to private corporations amounted to a "commercial activity" as
53. Id. at 27.
54. Id.
55. Princz v. F. R. G., 23 F.3d 1166, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1169, 1178.
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defined in the FSIA. He considered the question a close one but ul-
timately irrelevant. Even when a sovereign defendant's activity is indeed
"commercial," it triggers the exception from immunity only if it is
connected with the United States. At minimum, the activity must cause
a "direct effect" in the U.S.; Judge Ginsburg concluded that merely the
continued suffering of Mr. Princz in the United States was not a suffi-
ciently direct effect.
58
The treaty exception was rejected as well. In Amerada Hess, the
Supreme Court had pointed out that according to the legislative history,
this exception required that international agreements "expressly conflict"
with the FSIA's immunity provisions.59 The Court had interpreted this to
mean that a treaty must "create private rights of action ... to recover
compensation from foreign states in United States courts."6 Yet, Article
52 of the Hague Convention on land warfare, on which Mr. Princz
relied,6' had consistently been read not to provide such a right.62
The most difficult issues were presented by the waiver exception.
Certainly, Germany had never expressly consented to being sued for
Nazi atrocities in American courts. But under the FSIA, a foreign sover-
eign may also waive immunity "by implication., 63 This raised the ques-
tion whether the Third Reich had implicitly waived its immunity by
violating jus cogens. Judge Ginsburg considered the constructive waiver
argument made in the student comment cited above, 64 but concluded that
"an implied waiver depends upon the foreign government's having at
some point indicated its amenability to suit.'' 65 Following Siderman, he
found that violations of jus cogens in and of themselves do not amount
to such an indication. He thus rejected the waiver exception as well.66
58. Id. at 1171-73.
59. 488 U.S. at 442 (quoting H. R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1976); S.
REP. No. 1310, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1976)).
60. Id.
61. Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2277, reprinted in THOMAS BARCLAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 130-43
(1917). This was apparently the only convention invoked by the plaintiff. Both the United
States and Germany are parties to the convention.
62. Princz v. F R. G., 26 F.3d 1166, 1175 (1994).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1).
64. Implied Waiver, supra note 33.
65. Princz v. F. R. G., 26 F3d 1166, 1174 (1994).
66. The waiver argument also depended on another assumption, namely that Nazi
Germany had actually violated jus cogens. The problem here was not whether genocide,
enslavement, and similar acts were prohibited by absolutely binding norms of international
law - Judge Ginsburg followed Siderman in holding that they were - but whether such jus
cogens existed in 1942-45. This was doubtful because massive human rights infringements
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Judge Wald's disagreement with the majority opinion was narrow
but decisive.67 In her long and spirited dissent, she focused on the
waiver issue. She essentially endorsed the argument of the student
comment, which she duly cited, and concluded that violations of jus
cogens should be considered an implicit waiver of immunity. A state
committing such violations, she maintained, loses its claim to immunity
under international law.68 Since domestic law must. be construed con-
sistently with international law, this justifies a denial of immunity under
the FSIA as well. Judge Wald found such a construction possible in
light of the inconclusive language of the FSIA and of its legislative
history. She also considered her approach compatible with the in-
tentionality requirement of the waiver exception because, at least in this
case, "Germany could not have helped but realize that it might one day
be held accountable for its heinous actions by any other state, including
the United States." 69
D. The Significance of the Case for Human Rights Suits
For those wishing to sue foreign sovereigns in American courts for
human rights violations suffered abroad, Princz destroyed whatever
hopes were left after Amerada Hess and Siderman through a combina-
tion of two elements.
On the one hand, the decision affirmed the principle that the FSIA
is the exclusive jurisdictional basis in such suits. After Amerada Hess
had established this principle generally for violations of jus cogens, and
Siderman had endorsed it specifically for human rights cases, Princz
now strengthened it further. By rejecting the District Court's arguments,
the Court of Appeals refused to limit or evade this fundamental rule,
either on account of the unprecedented scale of the human rights viola-
tions involved or because of the plaintiffs American citizenship.
On the other hand, the case demonstrated that it is nearly impossible
for plaintiffs successfully to invoke any of the FSIA's exceptions. Most
importantly, the treaty exception to the FSIA turns out to be worthless
to human rights plaintiffs. If a treaty, in order to warrant derlial of
immunity, must grant a private cause of action to sue in American
courts, this rules out not only the Hague Convention on land warfare
were first openly recognized as violations of international law in the Nuremberg Trials, i.e.
after World War II. Nonetheless, Judge Ginsburg wrote, without further analysis, that the
Third Reich had violated jus cogens norms on an unprecedented scale. Id. at 1174.
67. Id. at 1176-85.
68. Id. at 1183.
69. Id. at 1184.
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invoked by Hugo Princz, a largely forgotten and rarely applicable instru-
ment, but virtually all modem human rights conventions as well. Since
none of those ratified by the United States grants a private right to sue a
foreign sovereign in American courts,7 ° it appears that they cannot
trigger the treaty exception of the FSIA. The commercial exception will
normally not help a plaintiff, even if he is enslaved abroad for commer-
cial gain, since the "direct effect" requirement is not fulfilled by the
continued suffering in the United States.7' Finally, the waiver exception
will hardly ever apply if violations of jus cogens do not count as con-
structive waiver. It is almost unthinkable that a foreign sovereign will
openly consent to being sued -in American courts on human rights
violations.72 That leaves only cases in which the defendant is deemed to
have waived its immunity in some other manner, although not really
intending to do so. Such cases will be very rare.73
If Princz makes the situation of human rights plaintiffs so hopeless,
did the Court of Appeals get the law wrong? Unfortunately, the answer
is no, at least if wrong means contrary to existing authority and accepted
rules of legal reasoning.
The insistence on the general applicability of the FSIA even to
violations of jus cogens was largely dictated by Amerada Hess. It is true
70. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra
note 20, provides no private cause of action. The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (ratified by the United States on June 8, 1992)
requires the signatory states to provide effective remedies for violations of its provisions (art.
2) but is not self-executing. See Sen. Comm. on Foreign Relations, Report on the Internation-
al Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, S. REP. No. 23, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. 19 (1992).
Under Article 14 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane, or Degrad-
ing Treatment or Punishment, supra note 20, the signatories must provide victims with
remedies and a right to compensation. The convention was implemented by the Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, which, however, grants remedies only
against individuals, not against states, and does not affect the sovereign immunity of foreign
states. See supra note 8.
71. It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court recently construed "direct effect" very
broadly in a purely commercial context. When a debtor obligated to deposit money into a
New York bank account failed to pay, the default was held to create a "direct effect" in the
United States although both debtor and creditor were foreign parties. Republic of Argentina v.
Weltover, 112 S. Ct. 21, 60 (1992). A cynic will note that apparently the suffering of a
foreigner's American bank account is a better reason to deny immunity than the continued
impairment of an American citizen's personal well being. To be sure, Weltover and Princz are
distinguishable because in Weltover the effect was immediate (no money in the New York
account when the debtor defaulted) while in Princz there was a time lag between the injury
suffered and the plaintiff's return to the United States. Whether this justifies the difference in
outcomes is, of course, another question.
72. Occasionally, however, sovereigns have consented to suits against their former
officials, see Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
73. But they do exist. See, e.g., Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d
699 (9th Cir. 1992).
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that Amerada Hess involved loss of property, not a violation of human
rights, but the Supreme Court's language was so broad and unequivocal
that a distinction on these grounds would have been highly implausible,
as the Ninth Circuit in Siderman recognized. Moreover, Judge Sporkin's
reasons in the court below for deviating from Amerada in Princz are
indefensible if one takes the statute seriously. Nothing in its structure,
language, or legislative history suggests that it is inapplicable to outlaw
governments and their successors or to particularly egregious wrongs.
Nor does it allow a preferential treatment of American citizens since it
currently does not distinguish between American and foreign plaintiffs.
Unsurprisingly, Judge Sporkin cited no support for his conclusions.
Most of the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the various excep-
tion clauses was likewise required by caselaw and statutory language.
The narrow reading of the treaty exception was, again, not Judge
Ginsburg's idea, but demanded by Amerada Hess. The refusal to con-
sider continued suffering a sufficiently "direct effect" in the United
States of potential commercial activity abroad only endorsed the prevail-
ing view and was well supported by case law.
74
The only truly debatable conclusion was the majority's intepretation
of the waiver exception. The Supreme Court had not decided the issue
and, while the Ninth Circuit had, Siderman was not binding precedent in
Princz. Thus there was room for disagreement between majority and
dissent. Yet, one need not decide this, dispute in order to conclude that
the majority's decision was correct in the sense defined above. Judge
Ginsburg's refusal to consider the violation of international jus cogens a
"waiver" of immunity is supported by the plain meaning of the term
which implies some expression of intent to renounce protection, the use
of the term in the FSIA,75 the legislative materials cited,76 and the gener-
al message of Amerada Hess to take the language of the act seriously.
This is not to say that Judge Wald's contrary conclusion is indefensible.
Yet, even Judge Wald did not maintain that her colleagues were off
limits, only that a more liberal construction of the waiver exception was
both possible and preferable.
Thus, if there is a problem with Princz, it is not that the decision is
wrong, but that it is right. In other words, the problem is not how the
Court applied the law, but how the law conceives of the importance of
74. See Princz v. F. R. G., 26 F.3d 1166, 1173 (1994), and the cases cited therein.
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) preserves the sovereign's right to withdraw a waiver in
accordance with its terms, which suggests that giving a waiver requires a more or less
conscious decision.
76. See 26 F.3d at 1174.
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human rights vis-A-vis sovereign immunity.
After Princz (and Siderman), one must acknowledge that the efforts
to persuade the courts to recognize a human rights exception to
sovereign immunity have failed. The lesson of Princz is that in order to
allow claims for human rights violations against foreign sovereigns in
American courts, Congress would have to change the FSIA. It should.
III. AMENDING THE FSIA: THE CASE FOR ALLOWING SUITS
FOR MASSIVE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
Last term, Congress had before it a bill to amend the FSIA by
adding a new exception to immunity from 28 U.S.C. § 1605.77 Immunity
would be denied in actions
in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for the
personal injury or death of a United States citizen occurring in
such foreign state and caused by the torture or extrajudicial killing
of that citizen, or by an act of genocide committed against that
citizen, by such foreign state or by any official or employee of
such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office
78or employment ....
It is important to note that the envisaged denial of immunity is carefully
limited in three ways. It applies only to the most horrible and un-
disputed human rights violations, only to suits by American plaintiffs,
and it requires the prior exhaustion of "adequate and available remedies
in the place in which the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred." Its
limitation periods and definitions of the most important terms track
those in the international conventions against torture and genocide.79 If
such a bill were enacted, American victims abused abroad but without
legal recourse there may sue foreign states for some of the most egre-
77. The originally proposed legislation was not a direct reaction to the Princz decision,
which was handed down after the introduction of the bill, but more generally to the physical
abuse of United States citizens by foreign sovereigns "in recent years." H. R. REP. No. 702,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1994). However, there were later versions which responded directly
to the Court of Appeals' rejection of Mr. Princz's claim. They provided specifically for denial
of immunity to the German Federal Republic for acts of genocide committed against Ameri-
can citizens during World War II. H.R. 934, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., version 3 of October 10,
1994 and version 4 of October 13, 1994. These later versions are not my concern here. I do
not wish to support such legislation aimed solely at one particular country.
78. H.R. 934, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1994). The bill was passed by the House of
Representatives on Oct. 7, 1994. 140 CONG. Rrc. D 1243 (1994), and was referred to the
Senate Judiciary Committee on Oct. 8, 1994. 140 CONG. REc. S. 14827.
79. See supra note 70.
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gious human rights violations in American courts.
The case for such a legislative change rests on several major argu-
ments. It is best to think of them as a prima facie case for allowing suits
for human rights violations on the one hand and a series of rebuttals to
.the major defense - sovereign immunity - on the other.
A. The Prima Facie Case for Denying Immunity
The prima facie case is plain but powerful. To close the court doors
to victims of extreme human rights violations is a complete denial of
access to justice in cases that cry out for legal remedies perhaps more than
any other. The injuries inflicted by torture, genocide, or extrajudicial
killing are the gravest imaginable. Denial of court access is especially
serious when it occurs in the victim's home country. In such a case, the
very government that demands loyalty from, and thus owes protection to,
the plaintiff, refuses to assist him in the vindication of his undisputed
rights. As a result, the state deprives him of what is normally his only
hope for compensation.
Three important conclusions flow from this fairly obvious argument.
First, a denial of access to justice based on sovereign immunity is an
exception to the basic principle that victims of wrongs ought to have their
day in court. It is thus misleading to think of a human rights clause in the
FSIA as an "exception"; the true exception is immunity. A human rights
clause restores the general principle of court access in deserving cases.
Second, since closing the court doors is the exception rather than the rule
in human rights cases, it is granting sovereign immunity, not denying it,
that requires specific justification. Third, since the principle of access to
justice is of the greatest importance in a society committed to the rule of
law, the justification for an exception (denying access on grounds of
immunity) ought to be very strong indeed. In short, immunity in human
rights cases should be granted only if there are compelling reasons.
The most obvious response is, of course, that the courts of one
sovereign should not sit in judgment on another sovereign. But this is only
a restatement of the traditional rule, not a reason for it. Surely, reasons
do exist, but are they strong enough even in human rights cases to support
an exception to access to justice? The main arguments worth considering
may be that granting sovereign immunity is legally required, politically
necessary, and practically useful. Even a brief survey suggests that in
human rights cases, these justifications are weak.
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B. Legal Perspectives
There is a serious question whether such a (partial) denial of immunity
would violate international law. 0 A first glance suggests that it would."'
There is widespread agreement that under international law one state is
not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of another with regard to
sovereign acts (as opposed to commercial activity).,2
Yet, closer examination quickly reveals that the issue is more com-
plicated than that. Since the sovereign immunity rule is neither a matter
of jus cogens nor provided by treaty, it is only a rule of customary
international law. And like all such law, it is not cast in stone. Instead,
it is somewhat amorphous in two respects. First, its content and contours
are not precise to begin with, thus there is room for debate about its
scope. 83 Second, it is subject to constant development and refinemeht, as
especially the trend from an absolute to a restrictive concept of immunity
has illustrated in the past decades. 84 As a result, sovereign immunity today
is not so much a yes or no question but a matter of changing practice, of
degree, and of argument.
The crucial question then becomes whether a human rights exception
is supported by reasons sufficiently convincing to justify a further
restriction of sovereign immunity. Some such reasons have already been
suggested by plaintiffs and academic writers 5 and have occasionally been
accepted by the bench. 6 At their core, these arguments are rather
straightforward, and a brief summary will suffice. In essence, the propo-
sition is that since the human rights considered here are today87 part of
80. In contrast, it is clear that the U.S. Constitution does not stand in the way since it does
not require granting sovereign immunity. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S.
480, 486 (1983).
81. See Zimmerman, supra note 5.
82. The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra
note 20, Ch. 5 Subch. A., Introductory Note, and § 451; ALFRED VERDROSS & BRUNO SIMMA,
UNIVERSELLES VOLKERRECHT 763 (3d ed. 1984). See also International Law Commission, Draft
on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of its Forty-Third Session 29 Apr.-19 July 1991, U.N. G.A.O.R., 46th
Sess., Supp. No. 10 (A/46/10).
83. See BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 329-36.
84. See especially the so-called "Tate Letter." Letter from the Acting Legal Advisor of the
Department of State, Jack B. Tate, to the Department of Justice, May 19, 1952, 26 DEP'T ST.
BULL; 984 (1952); BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 326-29.
85. See Implied Waiver, supra note 33, for further references.
86. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F2d 699, 718 (9th Cir. 1992); Princz
v. F. R. G., 26 F.3d 1166, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald, J., dissenting).
87. Not necessarily, however, at the time when Hugo Princz suffered in the German
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international jus cogens and therefore by definition unconditionally
binding on all states, a state cannot demand sovereign immunity for their
violation. This proposition goes back to the Nuremberg International
Tribunal's denial of immunity to the Nazi defendants for their crimes
against humanity.88 In the main, two particular explanations are proffered
for this proposition. One is that norms of jus cogens automatically limit
the very sovereignty of the states. Sovereignty thus never extends beyond
the limits drawn by the unconditionally binding rules of international law.
Consequently, an act violating jus cogens is not a sovereign act and thus,
like a commercial act, is not entitled to immunity.89 The other rationale
is thatjus cogens has a higher rank than plain customary international law,
and since core human rights are part of the former, while sovereign
immunity is only part of the latter, human rights trump the claim to
immunity.
These explanations are not implausible, but they have a conceptualist
air about them. They also suggest troublesome consequences. It appears
to follow from them that sovereign immunity not only may, but must be
denied in cases of jus cogens violation.9 This would go too far. Just as
no state has to sanction another state's violation of international law, the
forum state must remain free to grant immunity under its municipal law
in all cases, and to whom, it sees fit. One state's violation of law cannot
deprive another state of its right to control access to its own courts.
There are other arguments, though, that are at least equally convincing
but less far reaching. They suggest only that the forum may, or at most
should (but not must) deny immunity for massive human rights violations.
These arguments are best understood in the context of the two major
principles underlying the sovereign immunity rule, namely noninterference
with another state's internal affairs, and equality of sovereigns. 91
concentration camps and factories, see supra note 66, and accompanying text.
88. See Princz, 26 F.3d at 1181.
89. Implied Waiver, supra note 33,.at 377, 390-91; Mary Ellen Turpel & Philippe Sands,
Peremptory International Law and Sovereignty: Some Questions, 3 CONN. J. INT'L L. 364,
365-66 (1988); Princz v. F. R. G., 26F.3d 1166, 1182 (Wald, J., dissenting); see also Hilao
v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litigation), 25 F.3d 1467, 1470-71
(9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 934 (1995) (acts of torture, execution, and disappearance
committed by head of state were not covered by FSIA because they were not covered by official
authority).
90. Since these rationales are proffered in the context and in support of the waiver
argument, it is not clear whether the proponents actually assume that the forum state is under
an obligation to deny sovereignty. See Implied Waiver, supra note 33, at 389-90; Princz, 26
F.3d at 1179-80, 1183 (Wald, J., dissenting).
91. See BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 324 n.25.
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Sovereign immunity is granted in part in order to avoid the possibility
that the courts of one state will interfere with the affairs of another. While
the principle makes general sense, it fails with regard to the FSIA amend-
ment here in question. Protection of human rights, at least of those that
arejus cogens, is no longer a purely internal matter of any individual state
but recognized today as a concern of the community of all nations.92 Of
course, this justifies primarily collective action and does not necessarily
make it appropriate for a state to open its courts to plaintiffs from all over
the world. Instead, an individual country's courts should hear only cases
in which this country has a specific and legitimate concern. The human
rights amendment reflects such a concern: the interest in the treatment of
one's own citizens. Where Americans have been abused by foreign
sovereigns, as required for the exception to kick in, the adjudication of
their claims is not an undue interference with another country's purely
internal affairs.93 In fact, the FSIA already reflects a similar consideration
in that it denies immunity for tortious acts committed in United States
territory.94 Thus the proposed change supplements the territorial exception
already in place by extending it on grounds of the victim's citizenship.
In order to avoid undue interference with the defendant state's
interests, it is important not to apply American law and compensation
standards in an uncritical manner. Instead, we need to develop a choice
of law approach for human rights cases against foreign sovereigns that
takes the international nature of the dispute and the foreign state's
legitimate interests into account. International law will normally only
establish the prima facie wrongfulness of the act so that other issues must
be decided under municipal rules. How to choose, or how to find a
compromise, between them raises difficult issues that must be left for
another day. Suffice it to say that in order to enhance the international
acceptability of results, courts in human cases against foreign sovereigns
should tread lightly and err on the side of deference to the defendant
state's law as long as such law is acceptable under international stan-
dards. 95
92. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3, art. 55(c), art. 56; Rest. 3d, supra note 20, § 702 cmt.
0; OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 1000.
93. The new exception would also require that the plaintiff exhaust available remedies in
the foreign country involved. H.R. 934, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1994) (concerning 28 U.S.C.
1605(a)(7)(B) (1988)). This would thus give the defendant state a chance to avoid a lawsuit in
the United States altogether.
94. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)..
95. In light of the long tradition and widespread international acceptance of the principle
that tort liability is governed by the law of the place of the wrong, much can be said in favor
of a prima facie territorial approach.
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Sovereign immunity is also a manifestation of the principle that all
states are considered equals in the international community. They should
thus treat each other with deference and mutual respect rather than sit in
judgment over one another. Yet, this principle makes sense only as long
as these states mutually adhere at least to the norms that are considered
indispensible for the community of which they wish to be a member.
Where a nation violates jus cogens, however, it steps outside the boun-
daries drawn by the international community for itself. It thus forfeits the
privileges accorded to the members. In other words, as an outlaw, it has
no claim to deference and respect. This is essentially what Judge Sporkin
meant when he denied immunity to Germany as a former rogue govern-
ment.
96
There may have been a time when sovereign immunity was granted
unconditionally. Today, it should be considered a privilege contingent on
compliance with at least the most fundamental rules which the community
of nations has set for itself. It makes no sense to recognize unconditionally
binding norms of international law and at the same time to shield
perpetrators who violate these norms from legal action.
C. Political Considerations
Since, as a matter of international law, these considerations only allow,
but do not require, the denial of immunity, the decision Congress has to
make about the amendment of the FSIA is largely political. Here, the
concerns are of three kinds. They pertain to the relationship between the
branches of government, to considerations of efficiency in human rights
enforcement, and to the risk of suffering retaliation by foreign states. In
all these respects, the arguments point both ways.
The relationship between the branches of government is an issue
because court judgments against foreign sovereigns could interfere with
the foreign policy of the political branches. This concern, however, should
not be overstated. While it may loom large when the courts act on their
own initiative, it is much diminished when the political branches, notably
Congress, decide to empower the courts to hear suits against foreign
sovereigns, as would be the case with the human rights amendment.
Moreover, where the political branches have committed themselves openly
to the international promotion of human rights, occasionally even through
military intervention, a major conflict between these branches and the
judiciary should be the exception rather than the rule. Where a judgment
96. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. While there is no place for this argument
under current domestic American law (i.e., the FSIA), it is permissible and, indeed, plausible
as a matter of international law.
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is rendered against a military dictatorship, it may actually strengthen the
foreign policy directed against such regimes. Where it concerns a close
ally, it is unlikely to do much damage. After all, it is hard to believe that
German-American relations would have suffered significantly had a United
States court held Germany liable to Hugo Princz.
Possible interference is also a risk in the commercial area, yet the
commercial exception to sovereign immunity is almost universally
accepted today and clearly stated in the FSIA.97 It is true that human rights
are politically much more sensitive, and that sitting in judgment over
another sovereign's alleged violations may strain international relations
and cause friction with other countries. Yet, even this argument goes only
so far. While adjudicating massive human rights violations may have
political effects, so does shielding them from judicial action. Granting
immunity means protecting a foreign sovereign with regard to outrageous
and almost indisputably illegal acts. It would be naive to ignore that such
protection may support foreign governments in their policies either to
violate human rights or at least to tolerate such violations. In short,
stripping perpetrators of their immunity will undoubtedly make some
foreign countries nervous, but where massive human rights violations are
at issue, such nervousness is not necessarily harmful and may help United
States foreign policy.
From an effectiveness perspective, it is worth asking whether human
rights are better protected if their enforcement is left to the political
branches.98 The answer is not clear,99 whether in individual cases, vis-t-vis
particular countries, or in the grand picture. The executive's influence in
individual cases is hard to predict. In Princz, for example, political action
was plentiful but availed the plaintiff nothing.'0° The success of the
political branches with regard to particular states depends on a variety of
uncertain factors, prominent among them the willingness to risk American
access to foreign markets, and here the record is certainly mixed. On a
worldwide level there may be a concern that subjecting foreign states to
liability for human rights violations could make them more reluctant to
enter into human rights conventions lest they be bound by them. This
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988).
98. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423, 431-32 (1964)
(supporting the application of the act of state doctrine with the argument that political and
diplomatic action may be more effective than court proceedings to secure the rights of American
parties allegedly violated by foreign governments).
99. See H. R. REP. No. 702, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (expressing doubts about the
effectiveness of action taken by the State Department).
100. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
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concern is largely speculative, particularly since jus cogens binds even
those states not signatories to any convention so that non-membership is
not an excuse for violating basic human rights. To the extent that there
may be an actual deterrent effect, it will be small and a price worth paying
for making perpetrators accountable.
With regard to all these concerns, it is important to remember that
allowing courts to hear human rights cases against foreign sovereigns does
not prevent the political branches from promoting human rights on their
own. They may actually find themselves in a more advantageous position
if some of the responsibility is shifted to the courts. As in cases of
commercial activity, the executive could plausibly argue vis-A-vis the
foreign sovereign that its hands are tied while at the same time trying to
defuse the conflict and to facilitate a settlement. Also, the possibility that
court action may jeopardize long-term political goals is small comfort to
the individual victim who finds her interests sacrificed on the altar of a
future, and often elusive, common good. In a society committed to
individual rights, such a price should not be demanded lightly.
Finally, further restricting the immunity of foreign states in American
courts entails the risk of retaliation. Foreign states may in turn allow their
courts to sit in judgment on the United States in certain cases. This is
tolerable where the denial of immunity is appropriately limited, as under
the envisaged FSIA amendment, and where the foreign tribunal ensures
a minimum of procedural and substantive fairness. After all, if the United
States should torture or murder a foreign national and then fail to provide
the plaintiff with a sufficient remedy in its own courts, it should have to
answer in neutral forums of the claimant's home country. Yet, there is no
guarantee either that retaliatory immunity exceptions will be so limited,
nor that all foreign tribunals will provide an acceptable level of impar-
tiality and fairness. While in case of an adverse decision the United States
may still be able to avoid the financial cost by refusing to recognize the
judgment,'0 ' it could not avoid the political cost of being adjudged,
perhaps unfairly, a human rights perpetrator. How large that risk is is hard
to tell. At the end of the day, whether to accept it or not is a political
choice. Acceptance requires some self-confidence and courage. It would
fit a nation committed to the promotion of international human rights
much better to show than to lack these qualities.
101. Provided, of course, that the respective immunity exception does not extend to the
execution of a judgment against government assets such as diplomatic or consular missions.
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D. Practical Concerns
Nor do practical concerns make it unwise to amend the FSIA. The
danger of human rights suits flooding American courts is small since the
number of acts of torture, genocide, and extrajudicial killing committed
against American citizens abroad is and will remain tiny in comparison
to the overall docket. The courts will not be at a loss-to find standards for
adjudication because the wrongfulness of the acts in question is already
beyond doubt and causes of action can be determined under traditional
choice of law principles. The taking of evidence and the execution of
judgments present problems of their own, but that is true in many other
cases and hardly justifies closing the courts to plaintiffs altogether."°2
In sum, the arguments against immunity for massive human rights
violations are strong. Even though there are reasons for sovereign im-
munity in general, in human rights cases they do not weigh heavily. They
are insufficient to deny victims of torture, genocide, or extrajudicial killing
access to justice. In fact, the same could be said for other core human
rights recognized as jus cogens, like enslavement or systematic racial
discrimination, and it would be desirable to include these wrongs in the
proposed amendment.
Though the United States should not become the courthouse of the
world, Congress should give those to whom it owes protection their day
in court against a foreign state that has violated their rights in a manner
condemned by domestic as well as international law.
IV. FURTHER HURDLE: THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
Beyond the obstacle of sovereign immunity, a plaintiff in a human
rights case against a foreign sovereign faces another potential hurdle: the
claim will normally arise from acts of a foreign government within its own
territory and thus implicate the act of state doctrine.'0 3 If a court finds the
doctrine applicable, a human rights exception to sovereign immunity is
virtually meaningless. The plaintiff could now drag the defendant into
court, but the case would still be dismissed without a hearing on the
102. For an analysis of a variety of other legal and practical issues, see Implied Waiver,
supra note 33, at 402-11.
103. The act of state doctrine holds that courts in the United States "will not sit in judgment
on the acts of the government of another [state] done within its own territory." Underhill v.
Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897); see also Rest. 3d, supra note 20, § 443(l). The act of
state doctrine is not required by international law but is a matter of American municipal law
only.
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merits. °4 Whether the proponents of the human rights amendment to the
FSIA were aware of this problem is not clear, 05 but it is clear that they
should consider it.
The act of state doctrine is an amorphous construct, based on many
unclear and sometimes contradictory grounds." 6 A thorough analysis of
its impact on human rights cases could well fill a book, and this is not the
place to write it. It will suffice here to explain the doctrine, show briefly
why it should not apply, and to suggest that Congress dispel any doubts
by statute.
A. The Shadow of Sabbatino
The act of state doctrine presents a problem for human rights plaintiffs
mainly because of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino.1° In Sabbatino, the Court held that that the doctrine
governs even when the act complained of is a violation of international
law. Whether the Court was right or wrong is not the issue here. 108 The
fact is that this decision conflicts with a denial of immunity in human
rights cases. While sovereign immunity would be denied largely because
massive human rights infractions violate international law, the act of state
doctrine would apply even though they do.
It is not difficult to distinguish Sabbatino from the cases here in
question. Like most modern precedents in this area, Sabbatino concerned
expropriation, not human rights. It also did not involve jus cogens, but
only customary international law which was neither accepted as uniformly
nor considered as essential to the international community as is the
prohibition of genocide or torture. Yet it is not clear that the act of state
doctrine as proclaimed in Sabbatino and its progeny does not apply to
human rights cases. Surely it is a doctrine pertaining generally to
104. The act of state doctrine has repeatedly led courts to deny review in cases where
sovereign immunity was not even an issue because the defendant was a private individual; see,
e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), Bernstein v. Van Heyghen
Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947). In Princz, the Federal Republic of
Germany invoked the doctrine as well. [Defendant's] Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject
Matter Jurisdiction at 7-8, Princz v. F. R. G., 813 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1992) (No. 92-0644)
(on file with the author).
105. H. R. REP. No. 702, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) does not consider the act of state
doctrine.
106. See JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORA-
TIONS 276-94 (1988).
107. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
108. The reasons against the application of the act of state doctrine were powerfully argued
by Mr. Justice White in his dissenting opinion. 376 U.S. at 439-72.
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sovereign acts on foreign soil"° and, while there is some authority for a
human rights exception, I1° such an exception is far from firmly estab-
lished.
B. Why the Act of State Doctrine Should Not Apply
Whatever the precise meaning of the act of state doctrine, it is clear
that it concerns only sovereign acts. It is possible' to argue, as noted
above,"' that violations of jus cogens are not sovereign acts per se, and
therefore the doctrine does not apply. Such a proposition is rather con-
clusory and begs more questions than it answers. Yet, acts of torture or
genocide will most likely violate the domestic law of the foreign state as
well. This is a proper reason not to recognize such acts as official and thus
to exclude them from the ambit of the act of state doctrine."
2
Nonetheless, the crucial question must be whether the doctrine should
apply in light of the policies which it embodies. There is little agreement
regarding the exact nature, the respective weight, and the interrelationship
of these policies." 3 Even so, one can perhaps identify five major aspects.
One reason behind the act of state doctrine is respect for the separation
of powers between the branches of government. The doctrine serves to
avoid judicial interference with the executive's prerogative in the area of
foreign relations." 4 For the reasons explained above, this' concern is
relevant but also easily overrated in human rights cases. Moreover, if
Congress denies sovereign immunity for human rights violations, it will
be difficult for an executive branch expressly committed to the protection
109. The first act of state doctrine case in the United States, Underhill v. Hernandez, 168
U.S. 250 (1897), for example, did not concern property, but an action for unlawful detention
and personal maltreatment.
110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 20, § 443 cmt. c; see also Forti v. Suarez-Mason,
672 F. Supp. 1531, 1546 (N.D.Cal. 1987) (violations of fundamental human rights committed
by subordinate government offical are not acts of state).
111. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
112. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d Cir. 1980) (doubting whether acts in
violation of the Constitution and laws of foreign state can properly be characterized as acts of
state); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In Re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litigation), 25 F.3d
1467, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 934 (1995) citing Trajano v. Marcos, 878
F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1989) (unpublished table decision holding that acts of torture, execution,
and causing disappearance were outside official -authority and thus not acts of state); see also
S. REP. No. 249, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1991) (act of state doctrine not applicable with regard
to acts covered by the Torture Victim Protection Act).
113. In its most recent decision about the doctrine, the U.S. Supreme Court construed it
narrowly. W. S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 406 (1990)
(doctrine involved only where "a court must decide ... the effect of official action by a foreign
sovereign .... ) (emphasis in original).
114. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964).
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of human rights to argue that acts of genocide or torture directed against
American citizens must remain unreviewable as a matter of national
interest.
Second, in another sense, the doctrine is also derived from the
principle of comity. Here it demands respect for the other co-equal
sovereign with regard to acts committed in its own territory which are
essentially considered the foreign state's own business." 5 Today, however,
violations of core human rights are an international concern, 16 and neither
respect nor comity are due when a sovereign violates jus cogens.
One can also see the doctrine from a third perspective as a form of
abstention in cases where there are no reliable standards for adjudication.
From this view, it is closely related to the political question doctrine."
7
Such a lack of standards may have been an issue in expropriation cases
like Sabbatino,"8 but this is not a problem with regard to human rights.
Human rights and prohibitions of their violation are embodied in a
panoply of international declarations and conventions, and there is no
doubt that at least as a matter of international law, acts of genocide or
torture are illegal. " 9 In light of these international agreements, it may even
be possible to invoke the treaty exception to the act of state doctrine. 20
There is also some authority for a fourth proposition: that the doctrine
is primarily a choice of law principle, although what exactly such a
principle commands. is not clear.' 2' If it simply means that acts of state
must be judged by the domestic law of the foreign state, the doctrine
would rarely help perpetrators in cases of extreme human rights violations
since their acts are normally illegal even under their own state's law. In
115. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
116. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
117. Whether there is room for the political question doctrine beyond the act of state
doctrine is not clear. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 106, at 287-94; see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 823-27 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Robb, J., concurring, applying the politi-
cal question doctrine in a case of terrorist attack and murder).
118. 376 U.S. at 428-30 (emphasizing lack of international agreement regarding the legality
of expropriations by a government).
119. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881-85 (2d Cir. 1980) (official torture clearly
and unambiguously prohibited by international law).
120. At least some courts have applied the treaty exception even though the treaty did not
expressly grant a private cause of action. Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Ethiopia, 729 F.2d
422 (6th Cir. 1984). Still, there is much uncertainty in this area. See DELLAPENNA, supra note
106, at 306-07.
121. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 106, at 279-81 (with further references); Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 438 (1964); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic
of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 705 n.18 (1976). Justice Marshall made the same point in his dissent.
Id. at 726. Most recently, the Supreme Court has again called the doctrine a "principle of
decision." W. S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 427 (1990)
(citing Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427).
Michigan Journal of International Law
the exceptional cases where foreign municipal law justifies such acts,
however, there is indeed good reason to apply it, at least presumptively.'
Yet one does not need a separate doctrine for that purpose because it can
be accomplished through the regular choice-of-law process.
Finally there may be a fifth rationale underlying the doctrine which
is, however, not openly stated in the leading cases. Refusal to review acts
of foreign sovereigns in their own territory can function as a quasi-res
judicata principle on an international level with regard to public acts. The
goal here would be to protect reliance on the validity of these acts.' 23 This
rationale makes sense in expropriation cases, but where human rights are
violated, such protection is not due because it could benefit no one but
the perpetrator.
It is no accident that the act of state doctrine is inappropriate for much
the same reasons that weigh against sovereign immunity in human rights
cases. Both concepts reflect many of the same policies and goals. Just as
foreign sovereigns sued for genocide, torture, or random killings of
American victims should not enjoy immunity from American jurisdiction,
neither should their acts be insulated from judicial scrutiny.
C. The Need for Clarification
While there is much to be said against, and little for, applying the
act of state doctrine to a foreign sovereign's human rights violations, the
content and the contours of the doctrine are so uncertain that the matter
is not entirely free from doubt. Certainly, if Congress amended the FSIA
to allow such suits, it would make little sense for the courts to deny
adjudication under the act of state doctrine, but there is no guarantee
against that. A court might, for example, be persuaded by the argument
that Congress did not wish to affect the act of state doctrine since the
lawmakers were surely aware of it and yet left it untouched. This is not
entirely implausible, since in the expropriation context Congress did in
fact severely limit the doctrine. 24 Nor would it completely nullify a
human rights exception to the FSIA because there are scenarios to
which it might not apply. The Princz case is an example - since most
of the acts were not committed on German territory but in an occupied
122. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
123. DELLAPENNA, supra note 106, at 282-84.
124. See 22 U.S.C. § 3270(e) (Hickenlooper Amendment to § 620(e) of the Foreign
Assistance Act).
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country, the acts may.be beyond the doctrine's territorial reach.'25 Those
cases, however, will be rare.
Congress should not run the risk that human rights claims which the
amendment to the FSIA would make possible will be defeated by the
act of state doctrine. It should clarify the matter and include in the
amendment a statement that to the extent immunity is denied, the act of
state doctrine shall not defeat the claim.
CONCLUSION
Princz is not a landmark decision but it is a case that sends a strong
and troubling signal. It forcefully illustrates how much protection even
barbaric foreign governments enjoy in American courts, and how little
access to justice their victims have, even if they are Americans seeking
such justice in their own land. When an American holocaust victim
demanding compensation from Germany for suffering beyond imagina-
tion finds the courts of the United States closed, such is indeed the law.
For the reasons angrily shouted by Judge Sporkin and more moderately
stated by some of his colleagues, it should be changed. Whatever the
substantive merits of Mr. Princz's or other plaintiffs' claims, victims of
massive human rights abuses deserve a decision on these merits, not a
denial of their day in court. The proposal before Congress last term
points in the right direction. Such a proposal is not radical, since it only
would allow American plaintiffs to sue for some of the most egregious
human rights violations, and would' require the prior exhaustion of
remedies in the defendant state. It is a minimal measure and should be
enacted, particularly since there is little reason to fear that it will wreak
havoc with the United States' relations with foreign countries.
Foreign sovereigns have increasingly been denied immunity in the
last half century, and some exceptions, notably for commercial activities,
are now firmly in place. As international interdependence grows and
traditional notions of sovereignty are eroded, this is a natural trend. A
human rights exception to sovereign immunity is a. proper next step.
Ideally, of course, this step would be taken by the community of nations
in an international convention, rather than unilaterally by individual
members, but there is no indication that such a convention may be
concluded in the foreseeable future. Human rights are too essential, and
the suffering of the victims is too real, to postpone unlocking the court
125. See Eric Stein, United States: Recovery of Property Confiscated by Enemy Oc-
cupant, I AM. J. COMP. L. 261, 264 (1952) (discussing State of the Netherlands v. Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, 99 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1951)).
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doors indefinitely. In an era marked by almost universal agreement
about core human rights, it is no longer appropriate to allow a state to
violate them with impunity. 26
Amending the FSIA by inserting a human rights exception would
help not only the victims. It would also send a clear message to the
perpetrators that they can no longer hide behind their sovereign status, at
least not in the courts of the victim's home. And it would be a signal,
both domestically and internationally, that at least the most essential
human rights are taken seriously, even if that comes at a political cost.
Finally, the amendment would be a modest but much needed con-
tribution to the actual enforcement of human rights. In the long run, this
contribution would perhaps not be so modest after all. It could set an
example that other nations may follow. In that case, overruling Princz
and similar decisions by Congressional statute could eventually lead to a
human rights exception to sovereign immunity even as a matter of
international law. It would be a small step for one country, but a giant
leap for mankind.
126. It is true, of course, that many states pay only lip service to human rights, but that
should be all the more reason to hold them accountable for violations.
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